Chairman of NKR Foreign Affairs Committee Vahram Atanesyan introduces his viewpoints regarding the consequences of Georgian-Ossetian military clash, and the unprecedented tension in Russian-Georgian and Russian-Ossetian relations.
“How do you estimate Russian-Ossian developments in terms of the change in the regional situation, the ratio of the powers in the region and the settlement of Karabkh conflict?”
“Of course Georgian adventurousness completely changed the situation in the region. Moreover because the country didn’t stand out with its stability in South Caucasus and today the situation is much worse than it used to be, the risk of inflicting frozen conflicts is growing.
If we try to judge from the point of view of Azerbaijani counteraction, than we must underscore that official Baku was anticipating Georgian “success”, most probably in that case not excluding the possibility of military attack from their side. In my view had Azerbaijan not been at the stage of presidential elections they would have started the same in Nagorno Karabakh in parallel with Georgian developments.
On the other hand judging from the discussions in Moscow and the West, especially with the French Chairman in the European Union, regarding the ways of the settlement of South-Ossetian and Abkhasian conflict, an atmosphere seems to have been created, when they are based not on the affectations of the internationally recognized countries but other realities. Which means military-political, and psychological realities turn into a certain factor for the settlement of conflicts. Particularly those three statements that the President of the Russian Federation addressed to the international community completely match with the realities existing in Armenian – Azerbaijani conflicting zone.
A question arises here – what would have been the reaction of the international community had Georgia been a success in displacing South-Ossetian citizens from their dwelling places. Or, if the citizens of South-Ossia don’t want to make up part of Georgia, can anyone impose this upon them.
We can also address the same statements to the international community, from the political point of view. What would have been the reaction of the international community had Nagorno Karabakh not averted Azerbaijani aggression in 1991-1994? Would they put up with the idea of 150 000 people having been displaced from their dwelling places.
If today Azerbaijan can’t put up with the idea that Nagorno Karabakh has the right to be the master of its own destiny, then does the international community have the competence to make Nagorno Karabakh be reintegrated with the united state of Azerbaijan?
These statements somehow change the general picture of the negotiation process and in some sense it can be considered a positive signal for the settlement of Armenian – Azerbaijani conflict. But of course nothing is identical in this world. The attitude of the same Russia and the European Union towards South Ossia can differ from their attitude towards Karabakh. And I don’t expect that the same things that have been said in terms of South Ossia or Abkhazia will be said in case of Karabakh.”
“Do you think Azerbaijan will learn a lesson from the consequences of the “blitz-war” in Georgian-Ossian conflict zone or they will be tempted by the Georgian scenario?”
“I don’t think what happened will unequivocally be a lesson for Azerbaijan, because the latter do understands that in case of a military instigation from their side the counteraction of the international community won’t be that operative, because of geopolitical and other reasons.
Meanwhile Azerbaijan is well aware that Georgia decided to give military solution to the issue, in case when South Ossia, in fact, didn’t have any self-defense system and forces. But the situation is quite different in Karabakh’s case. In my view Azerbaijanis take this into account and if we judge from the commentaries of the recent days it is evident that the enthusiasm of August 8 and 9 gradually reduced.”